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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES FROM TAXATION
The doctrine of inter-governmental immunities from taxation had
its origin in 1819 in the decision of McCullough v. Maryland.1 There
Chief Justice Marshall not only decided that a discriminatory state
tax upon a federal instrumentality was void, but added that a non-
discriminatory state tax of the same character would likewise be void,
since the state wholly lacked the power to tax a federal instrumen-
tality.2 The doctrine of McCullough v. Maryland was next extended to
include a non-discriminatory state tax upon the income of a federal
officer or employee in Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County.3 Col-
lector v. Dap' established a complete reciprocity of immunities, for it
state officers and employees were immune from federal taxation.5 Col-
lector v. Day also recognized the equality of national and state govern-
ments in their respective spheres, although this rationale was inconsist-
ent with the basis upon which Chief Justice Marshall put McCullough
v. Maryland, that the federal government was superior to that of the
states.0 The doctrine of inter-governmental immunities is based on the
theory that it is necessary for the protection of the national and state
governments in their respective spheres under our constitutional sys-
tem, and that it is necessary for the maintenance of our dual system
of government 7
This wholesale withdrawal of subjects from federal taxation was
curbed to some extent by the decision in South Carolina v. United
14 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L.ed. 579 (1819). A discriminatory tax by the state
of Maryland upon national banks for the privilege of issuing bank notes was
held unconstitutional, since it impeded the national government in the exer-
cise of its implied constitutional power to maintain a bank.
2"We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right to tax
the means employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its
powers." McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 430, 4 L.ed. 579,
607 (1819).
'16 Pet. (U.S.) 435, 10 Led. 1022 (1842). A state income tax on the salary
of a resident captain in the U. S. Revenue service was held invalid as a
burden upon the means employed by the federal government in the execution
of its powers. Accord: New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401,
81 L.ed. 306, 57 Sup. Ct. 269 (1937); Schlosser v. Welsh, 5 F. Supp. 993
(D.C., 1934).
411 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 29 L.ed. 122 (1871). It was held that Day, a state pro-
bate judge, was in the same position as Dobbins in Dobbins v. Commissioners
of Erie County, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 435, 10 L.ed. 1022 (1842), supra, note 3.
0 Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75
L.ed. 1277 (1931) held that the federal government was without the power
to tax the sale of a motorcycle to a municipal corporation which was to be
used by its police force. The salary of counsel for the public service com-
mission of the state was held immune from federal taxation. Burnet v. Live-
zey, 48 F. (2d) 159 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931).
0 The strength of Marshall's contention persisted even until one year before
the decision in Collector v. Day, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, supra, note 1, in the
decision of Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533, 19 L.ed. 482 (1870).
7 Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L.ed. 122 (1871); Willicuts v.
Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 75 L.ed. 304, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1931) ; Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 75 L.ed. 1277, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931) ; Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 76 L.ed. 1010, 52 Sup. Ct. 546 (1932).
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States5 in which it was decided that the immunity of state instrumen-
talities from national taxation was limited to those functions which
were of a "strictly governmental"9 character, and did not extend to
those which were used by the state in carrying on a private business.
This decision, therefore, destroyed the immunity of functions carried
on by the state governments in their corporate or proprietary capaci-
ties,'10 so that the instrumentalities themselves and the incomes derived
therefrom by the state officers and employees were no longer immune
from national taxation. Whether the converse of the rule in South
Carolina v. United States has application, has not been decided." In
theory, the rule cannot be extended to federal instrumentalities, since
the federal government is one of delegated powers. Therefore, the
federal government could constitutionally create only those instrumen-
talities whose purposes would have to be "essentially governmental."
Actually, however, Congress has created instrumentalities which con-
duct businesses very similar to those conducted by private enterprise?
2
If the court should find that federal proprietary instrumentalities exist,
there would seem to be no reason why the instrumentalities themselves
and the salaries of the officers and employees thereof should be immune
from state taxation under the doctrine of reciprocal immunities."a
Although the doctrine of South Carolina v. United States modified
to some extent the immunities from national taxation extended to state
governmental functions by Collector v. Day, there still remained within
the periphery of immunity the essential governmental functions of the
states and as a corollary thereto, the income of the officers and em-
ployees thereof. The Supreme Court of the United States in Brush v.
Conmnissionert 4 decided that the salary of the chief engineer of the
Bureau of Water Supply, City of New York, was immune from fed-
S199 U.S. 437, 50 L.ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905). The court in this case
refused to extend the immunity to a state conducted liquor dispensing busi-
ness. Accord: Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 359, 78 L.ed. 1307, 54 Sup. Ct.
725 (1934).
9 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911)
the function is denominated "essential governmental." Helvering v. Powers,
293 U.S. 214, 79 L.ed. 291, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934) uses the words "usual govern-
mental" as descriptive of the function.
-State of South Dakota v. Olson, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929) ; Denam
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 73 F. (2d) 193 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934);
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 79 L.ed. 291, 55 Sup. Ct. 171 (1934).
fIn Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 209, 80 L.ed.
586, 56 Sup. Ct. 125 (1936), the question was presented but the case was
decided on other grounds.
=The T. V. A., although it bases its constitutionality upon the federal power
over navigation and conservation, and theoretically, at least, is not in the
business of manufacturing and distributing power, is in fact as much of a
trader as was the state of South Carolina in South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437, 50 L-ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905).
13 T. V. A., Federal Loan Banks, and Home Loan Banks conduct, more or less,
private businesses.
14300 U.S. 352, 81 L.ed. 691, 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (1937).
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eral taxation because the water system conducted by the city is an
"essential governmental"' 5 function. This decision is noteworthy be-
cause in two previous cases decided by the Supreme Court it was
declared by way of illustration that the operation of a water system
was a proprietary function."' In Brush v. Commissioner the court
refused to apply the tort rule for the determination of whether a func-
tion was essentially governmental or proprietary in taxation cases,
because the objective of the tort rule was not the same as the objective
in taxation cases.' Whether the function was to be considered govern-
mental or proprietary for taxation purposes was to be determined on
the facts presented in each case by judicial "inclusion and exclusion."'1'
What functions the court considered essentially governmental can best
be stated in their own words: "Certainly, the maintenance of schools,
of a fire department, a system of sewers, parks, public buildings-to
say nothing of other facilities and uses calls for the exercise of govern-
mental functions."':1 Brush v. Commissioner and other cases20 decided
about the same time demonstrate that the interpretation by the Court
of "essential governmental functions" conferred immunity from fed-
eral taxation upon many subjects, which if taxed, would not burden
the state in the exercise of its sovereign powers. That there was a need
for revision, and that the Supreme Court of the United States was
ready upon proper submission of the question to revise the doctrine of
implied immunities was judicially hinted by Justices Stone and Car-
dozo in Brush v. Commissioner22 In that case, although they voted
with the majority, they did so only upon the ground that the taxpayer
had brought himself within the terms of the exemption prescribed by
the Treasury Department.2 2 Since the validity of the regulation making
such exemption was not challenged by the government, no opinion was
15 The Court declared that it was immaterial whether the function be denomi-
nated "usual governmental," "essential governmental," or "strictly govern-
mental." See supra note 9.
1, South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461, 50 L.ed. 261, 269, 26 Sup.
Ct. 110 (1905) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172, 55 L.ed. 389, 421,
31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911).
17 The rule adopted in tort cases was obviously formulated with the intent of
preventing injustice by the recognition of a technical defense.
" Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 365, 81 L.ed. 691, 696, 57 Sup. Ct. 495,
500 (1937).
19 Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 371, 81 L.ed. 691, 699, 57 Sup. Ct. 495,
503 (1937).
20 New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 81 L.ed. 306, 57 Sup. Ct.
269 (1937); Lamb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 755
(C.C.A. 5th, 1936) ; Hoskins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. (2d)
627 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
n Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 374, 81 L.ed. 691, 701, 57 Sup. Ct. 495,
505 (1937).
2 The regulation exempted from the federal income tax the compensation of
state employees received for services rendered in connection with the exercise
of an essential governmental function.
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expressed as to the need for the revision of the doctrine of implied
immunities as declared in earlier decisions. Heeding the' intimation, the
Treasury Department amended the regulation so as to open the way
for the government to argue the revision of the doctrine. An oppor-
tunity presented itself in the case of Helvering v. Gerhardt.24 Unfor-
tunately, the facts of the case did not present the issue squarely,
because the case may be restricted to the holding that the taxpayers
involved were not considered to be officers or employees of the state.
The instrumentality involved in Helvering v. Gerhardt was the Port
Authority, a bi-state corporation created by compact between New
York and New Jersey and approved by Congress; it was organized
to coordinate transportation facilities and to reduce traffic congestion.
The Court said that the functions of this instrumentality were not
necessary to the preservation of the state government. The language of
the case is strong enough to indicate that a contrary result would be
reached if the Brush case were to be litigated again. The indication is
that a tax laid on the income of an officer or an employee of an essen-
tial governmental function is not immune when the burden upon the
state because of the tax is merely speculative, and the tax will in all
probability, substantially or entirely, be absorbed by private persons.
The language and rationale of the decision is such as to suggest that
constitutional immunity from federal taxation of incomes now only
extends to those derived from functions necessary to the preservation
of the state government as such. This is tantamount to saying that
the implied constitutional immunity now exists only as to income
derived from exclusively governmental functions, viz. the maintenance
of its executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The court in Helvering v. Gerhard25 was very careful in recogniz-
ing the distinction between the immunity of the states and the immun-
ity of the national government, so that there is no reason to believe
that the doctrine of the immunity of federal instrumentalities from
state taxation as laid down in McCullough v. Maryland8 will be
abrogated. It is interesting to note in concluding that while the doc-
trine of McCullough v. Maryland has been challenged it still stands as
potent as ever; while the doctrine of Collector v. Day,27 its reciprocal in
the doctrine of inter-governmental immunities, has been narrowly
limited to the very point it decided, viz. the immunity of the salary of
a state judicial officer from federal taxation.
EDWARD SETLOCK.
The regulation was changed so as to give exemption only to the compensation
received by state employees which was immune from taxation under the
constitution of the United States.
24 58 Sup. Ct. 969 (1938).
5 Ibid.2 0 Supra note 1.
= Supra note 4.
19381 NOTES
